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COLERIDGE AND THE RULE OF LAW ON MALTA : ‘STATE-CRAFT’ AND THE 
‘DEPOSITORY OF THE SUPREME POWER’  
 
Barry Hough, Portsmouth Law School 
 
The venerable Public Secretary and Treasurer of Malta, Mr Macaulay, died 
suddenly during a thunderstorm in January 1805. Sir Alexander Ball, the Civil 
Commissioner, approached Coleridge to act as Public Secretary pro tempore. 
The British government had already nominated a Mr Chapman, to become 
Macaulay‟s successor; but this hapless official was at the time absent from 
Malta purchasing grain in sufficient quantities to feed the Island for a year.  
Chapman could not be recalled from the Black Sea region until this 
strategically important mission had been completed.   
Coleridge, who was merely a private visitor to Malta seeking a cure for his 
opium addiction, might not appear to have been an ideal temporary 
appointee to the most senior civil servant‟s post. In fact, his presence on the 
Island was opportune. Coleridge‟s popular journalism in England had 
demonstrated his flair in influencing public opinion, which Ball could now 
exploit. The British administration was beset by policy failures that were 
undermining Ball‟s authority, popularity and reputation amongst the Maltese. 
Many of the labyrinthine functions of the Public Secretary were delegated to 
other officials whilst Coleridge held office. Amongst his remaining 
responsibilities Coleridge undertook a public information campaign to re-
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establish the popularity and authority of the British administration. This was 
done in part by disguising the problem that the interests of the colonial 
power are not always aligned with those of the local population. One of 
Coleridge‟s tasks was to persuade the Maltese that British governmental 
policies served their best interests, which sometimes meant disguising their 
true purpose. He also had to reverse Ball‟s declining popularity.  
Coleridge would have been aware of the morally ambiguous position he now 
occupied. Whilst formal conventions on the use of government information 
had not yet been developed in his time, The Friend reveals that Coleridge 
was aware that moral integrity required the accuracy of the “total impression 
left by…words”. He observed in The Friend that message might be accurate 
but misleading because it was incomplete (I,49). Omissions are, as Coleridge 
well knew, as important to the truth of a message as inclusions. 
In The Friend Coleridge explored the origins of political obligation, of the 
relationship between citizen and state, the relationship between law and 
justice, the characteristics of a just Constitution, and above all the 
characteristics of a wise governor. In particular, the posthumous eulogy of 
Ball, whom he celebrated unreservedly as the embodiment of an ideal 
governor, reveals that Coleridge‟s thought was heavily influenced by his 
Malta experiences. But The Friend is problematic. First, we can ask whether 
Coleridge truly believed that Ball‟s policies were the exemplary courses of 
action of a wise and prudent government? If he did, what justified Ball in 
departing so comprehensively from the principles of just administration that 
Coleridge would stipulate in The Friend? How Coleridge imagined the 
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relationship between the British administration and the provincial population 
is an intriguing enigma of The Friend. 
The Friend also explored how the civil rights and freedoms of citizens could 
be safeguarded. The protection of civil liberties i had become a significant 
cause of tension during Coleridge‟s period in office (Memorial and Petition of 
the Maltese, British National Archive, Kew, CO 158/10/151).The present 
article draws on the Ball‟s criminal justice policies to explore some of the 
essential claims that Coleridge made. How far did Coleridge disguise Ball‟s 
true record? Did The Friend prescribe universal entitlements that would 
extend to British occupied territories, such as Malta? Since he understood 
just government as one founded on Reason which is “the fountain of all 
morality”, a significant question is whether Coleridge regard Reason as a 
morally informed system permitting different public law and administrative 
standards in overseas territories (I, 191)? What does The Friend tell us about 
Coleridge‟s thought on colonial rule? 
  
Maltese Context. 
In The Origins of the British Colonial System 1578- 1660 Beer describes how 
the shock sustained by the British political class after the successful 
secession of the American colonies produced a paradigm shift in the strategy 
for future colonial government. By the close of the eighteenth century, power 
was not to be shared with local population, especially where the territory was 
not intended for settlement by British settlers. Following the British conquest 
of Malta, the British decided to continue in force the institutions of the 
 4 
ancien regime, the Grandmasters of the Order of St John, and the existing 
corpus of Maltese law. The law making power and executive authority was 
then exclusively vested in the hands of the Civil Commissioner. In Malta 
there was to be no representative assembly, which meant that the Maltese 
were not to be consulted about policy, nor British policies formally debated 
by the Maltese elites (Royal Instructions, Hobart to Cameron, May 14
th
 1801, 
Kew, CO 158/1/88).  
One consequence of the „continuation‟ strategy affected the criminal justice 
system. An important feature of this system was that a Maltese could 
petition the Civil Commissioner in the Segnatura (Council) to have the  
sentence of the court disapplied or  amended in their case.  As William Eton 
described in his Authentic Materials for a History of the People of Malta, Ball 
could dispense justice, overturn court decisions and intervene in 
administrative process at will; there were no significant constitutional 
restraints on his powers. 
Whether the exercise of such unlimited, autocratic despotic powers was 
consistent with just and effective government was a different matter. The 
British had not appreciated that the Royal Instructions for the government of 
the Islands were potentially contradictory. Continuing the laws and policies 
of the former Grandmasters of the Order of St John  might not be consistent 
with the other primary strategic obligation: the “attachment” of the Maltese 
to British rule (Downing St to Ball, June 9
th
, 1802, Kew, FO 49/3/51). In other 
words, Ball had to ensure the popularity of his administration so that the 
Maltese would not question the legitimacy of British rule. The misplaced 
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assumption was that the exercise by the Civil Commissioner of the 
unrestrained autocratic powers of the former Grandmasters could be 
effective both for the vindication of British Imperial interests and achieving 
popularity with the Maltese. This assumption was fundamentally ill-judged.  
The British response to the anti-Semitic disturbances of May 1805, in which 
Coleridge played a significant part, reveals that civil liberties depended upon 
the caprice of the Civil Commissioner. The events unambiguously disclosed 
that the Rule of Law and the principles of a fair trial recognised by the 
English Common law had no place on Malta in the early British period. This 
was so even though, in International law, the Maltese had become British 
subjects at the time of the British conquest.   
In a limited, constitutional sense, the absence of criminal justice standards 
familiar to English Common lawyers was not surprising because the 
continuation of Maltese law meant that necessarily the English Common law 
would have no place on Malta. But this formal proposition overlooks the 
central point. This is that justice could not be achieved, and popularity 
ensured, if Ball used his full Constitutional authority to hold unfair trials and 
impose harsher sentences than the Maltese Criminal Code allowed. As 
Coleridge observed in The Friend,  “a Constitution  equally suited to China 
and America (..) must surely be equally unfit for both”, but morally informed  
and crucially effective government must be founded on the essential 
principles of fairness and the Rule of Law (I, 179).  Significantly, both Ball 
and Coleridge understood this. As Coleridge stated in The Friend, “Laws 
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obligatory on the conscience, can only therefore proceed from that Reason 
which remains one and the same..” (I, 192). 
 
Ball as Naval Commander 
Before turning to the British response to the anti-Semitic disturbances I want 
to draw attention to Coleridge‟s narrative about Ball as a navy captain. It was 
the alignment of Balls methods to the values of the rule of Law, most notably 
the principles of a fair trial that distinguished Ball a just and effective 
commander. The point Coleridge to put across to his readers was that  Ball 
understood that the Rule of Law fundamentally serves both the interests of 
justice and effective government.  
As a naval commander facing a mutinous crew Ball had abandoned the use 
of punishment to instil fear, which he judged would only suppress open 
violence and encourage the mutinous crew to engage in “secret plots and 
conspiracies”. He seems to have understood that adherence to prescribed, 
published rules provided for certainty and the predictability of punishment, 
which was a key ingredient of fairness. As Coleridge emphasised, “The new 
commander [Ball] instantly commenced a system of discipline as near as 
possible to that of ordinary law..” (Emphasis supplied) 
In landmark cases such as Entick v Carrington ((1765), 19 Howell’s State 
Trials 1029) the Courts in England and Wales had held that a person can 
only be convicted of an offence that had earlier been enacted into law.  An 
official who acts without existing legal authority acts unconstitutionally and, 
 7 
if that conduct unlawfully violates an individual‟s right to property or liberty, 
the official responsible is personally liable to pay damages.   
Ball ensured that a list of offences against military discipline, together with 
the penalty for infraction, was prominently displayed on the ship. Crucially, 
no officer on was entitled to vary the prescribed punishment, not even Ball 
himself.  Ball would also ensure a fair trial since the accused seaman would 
be given twenty four hours in which to prepare a defence (The Friend I, 169-
70). 
The Civil Commissioner understood that a fair trial culminating in a 
punishment set within the maximum limits prescribed by the law is a 
fundamental principle that was conducive to effective leadership. According 
to Coleridge, Ball knew that this took away “the very will of resisting”. Thus 
exercising power according to pre-established norms serves both 
deontological and consequential purposes.  
Rule of Law 
The principle that there can be no punishment except in accordance with a 
pre-determined law is almost a self-evident principle of justice that 
underpins most constitutions and, in our modern age, human rights 
instruments. In his De L'esprit Des Lois Montesquieu regarded the rule of law 
as a response to the concern that the arbitrary exercise of sovereign powers 
concentrated in the sovereign often results in despotic exercise of authority. 
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Montesquieu also promoted the idea of a separation of powers, which 
includes the principle that judges rather than politicians should try and 
punish offenders, and that executive and judicial powers should be exercised 
by different organs of the state. 
Coleridge would go further than this. He understood, and would explain in 
The Friend,  that principled and moral government delivered appropriate and 
just policy outcomes, whereas unprincipled interventions resulted only in 
short term political „fixes‟. In the case of a warship, the adherence to the 
Rule of Law resulted in loyalty, discipline and efficiency.  So much for a Royal 
Navy crew, what about Maltese civilian government?  
The anti-Semitic disturbances  
Tensions between the Maltese and the recently arrived Jewish immigrants 
culminated in an outbreak of anti-Semitic hysteria on Saturday, May 18
th
, 
1805 (CN 2 2646). As Coleridge later recorded in The Friend , the outbreak 
was a grave emergency (1, 544). He later described his shock when he 
thought he was about to witness “an intended massacre” of the Jews (to 
Hyman Hurwitz, January 4
th
 1820, unpublished, but noted, CN 2 2646n).    
Witness evidence supports Ball‟s later claim that the root of the disorder lay 
in the competition that the Jews provided to established Maltese businesses. 
When a Jew was jostled and insulted in St Paul‟s Street, Valletta, the angry 
Maltese shoemakers of the district surrounded him complaining that the 











, 1805, agitators untruthfully complained to 
each other that they had been assaulted or threatened by Jews. Hostile 
Maltese spread rumours that Jews were hunting their children for ritual 
slaughter - a reference to the ancient blood-libel traceable to Thomas of 
Monmouth‟s  The Life and Passion of St William the Martyr of Norwich, 
1173). Alcohol played its part in emboldening the aggressors. 
Outside Valletta and the four Cities passers-by thought to be Jews became 
vulnerable to attack. An attempt was made by a woman in Città Notabile 
(modern day Mdina) to have a man stoned. Fortunately, he was rescued 
unharmed by a sympathetic Maltese, although this intervention was not 
because the rescuer intended to save a Jew, but because the victim was 
known to be a French prisoner of war (National Archive of Malta 92/04, 
1805). What the outcome might have been had the prisoner been Jewish 
remains speculative.  
The atmosphere was undoubtedly tense. A crowd of more than two thousand 
people marched through Valletta in protest at the presence of the Jews (Ball 
to Windham, February, 28
th
, 1807, Kew, CO 158/13/25). Because their 
former ruler, the Grandmasters, had banned Jewish immigration, the 
demonstrators wanted to obtain a change of government policy. They were 
undoubtedly heading for the seat of government. Coleridge, who was 
present at the time, expressed what must have been the British reaction as 
they witnessed the large, noisy crowd approaching. The British authorities 
responded quickly. They detected and arrested the ring-leaders, interrogated 
them, framed the prosecutions and immediately conducted the trials. 
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Coleridge publicly announced the first convictions in an Avissi or Public 
Notices. The first was on Wednesday, May 22
nd
,1805 (LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 
1805 AL 1814 f8) and the second on May 25
th
, 1805 (ibid., f9). In the latter, 
Coleridge explained why Ball had sentenced Fortunata Tagliana, the female 
anti-Semite responsible for the attempted stoning of the Frenchman in Città 
Notabile, to life-long exile. His account was perhaps designedly misleading, 
which poses interesting questions about Coleridge‟s use of government 
information. An analysis of the document falls outside of the scope of the 
present article.  
His purpose in publishing the each of the Avissi was to deter future 
expressions of anti-Semitic hatred. Borg, Hasciach and Bonello  were each 
named and identified to their fellow citizens as instigators of anti-Semitic 
rumour-mongering. Their punishments were severe ones: each was to be 
whipped and banished from Malta for an indeterminate period. 
The remaining text of Coleridge‟s instrument of May 22nd 1805 is as follows: 
“His Excellency is determined to treat in the same manner all 
others who are discovered to have started, or who have been 
complicit in similar gossip. This includes those who have 
repeated these rumours in normal conversation, and those 
who, finding themselves present during the relation of such 
rumours, did not attempt to undeceive the listeners, or to 
inform the Tribunal of the Grand Court of Valletta. 
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As this is a situation which regards the peace of the public, the 
principal aim of any civil society, no status or condition of 
person, and not even minors, shall be exempt from the 
severity of the punishment.” 
This text discloses three problems, each of which reveals that Rule of Law 
and the separation of powers were principles that were not respected in the 
early British period.  
The first concern is that the Civil Commissioner rather than the trial judge 
was identified as the author of the sentences. This appears to be a public 
admission that the Maltese judiciary were not entitled to act independently 
of government. Coleridge is surprisingly uninhibited in telling the Maltese 
that their liberty depended on Ball and not the decision of the judge; in other 
words, punishment could be imposed according to the preferences of a 
politician rather than a judge enforcing the law.   
A court document dated May 24
th,
 1805 relating to the conviction of 
Fortunata Tagliana corroborates this conclusion about Ball‟s criminal justice 
policy. The document unambiguously stated that Tagliana‟s punishment was 
imposed by the Civil Commissioner and that the judge was acting on his 
direct orders. The material part of the document is as follows: 
“From [Notabile] she will be banished to the island of Gozo for as 
long as His Excellency sees fit. This is in line with the order given 
yesterday by His Excellency to the Judge” (NAM 92/04,1805). 
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But this is not all. In the case of Borg, Hasciach and Bonello the sentence of 
exile was not permitted by the Maltese Criminal Code, the Code de Rohan. 
Thus the punishment Ball imposed was more severe than the maximum 
permitted under the law. 
Coleridge‟s text reveals further concerns. He stated: 
 “His Excellency is determined to treat in the same manner all 
others who are discovered to have started, or who have been 
complicit in similar gossip. This includes those who have 
repeated these rumours in normal conversation, and those who, 
finding themselves present during the relation of such rumours, 
did not attempt to undeceive the listeners, or to inform the 
Tribunal of the Grand Court of Valletta.” (Emphasis supplied). 
The emphasised text extends the existing law. It makes clear that Ball had 
announced that he would in future punish certain behaviour. There was no 
suggestion that the Civil Commissioner was about to alter the law to make 
this possible: his decision that certain conduct would henceforth be 
punishable was sufficient. Coleridge unambiguously recorded that Ball would 
in future punish those who did not report rumour mongering. It signals that 
Ball was ready to punish any behaviour of which he wished to censure, 
whether or not it was legally prohibited. Any activities of which Ball 
disapproved could become punishable on his ipse dixit. The implications for 
civil liberties on Malta were obvious. 
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A final concern arises from Coleridge‟s text. He was careful to state that “no 
status or condition of person, and not even minors, shall be exempt from 
the severity of the punishment.” 
One of the convicted Maltese, Bonello, was a twelve year old boy from 
Cospicua.  This was the town where other convicted agitators resided - a 
place that had been a hot-bed of anti-Semitic sentiment.  The boy must have 
had his head filled with anti-Semitic sentiment, which was likely to have 
coloured his imagination when he set out to fish early on the morning of the 
day following the first outbreak. His difficulties with the authorities arose 
after he reported jumping into the Grand Harbour to flee from Jews whom he 
thought would attack him. He was arrested, tried and convicted for 
spreading the ancient blood-libel that children would be killed by Jews. On 
the evidence, his treatment appears to have been harsh, not least because 
witnesses in an ID parade could not identify him. Moreover, as a twelve year 
old, it would not have been surprising if he had given credence to what he 
had heard adults repeating. After all, if they were sufficiently gullible to 
believe that the Jews were stealing children (when none were missing) how 
could a boy be expected to realise the truth? As we shall see, the boy‟s 
ignorance was a ground which his mother was later to argue justified 
clemency. 
None of the problems with Bonello‟s case impressed Ball who, through 
Coleridge, expressly informed the Maltese that even minors would be liable 
to punishment. Coleridge‟s text explicitly abolished the rule of doli incapax, 
which is the conclusive presumption that a child under the age of criminal 
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responsibility could not be legally responsible.  Ball‟s instructions meant that 
no matter how young or immature any child could be indicted for the mere 
actus reus of the new “crime” (in this case repeating untrue words about the 
Jews, whether or not the child understood that the words were untrue). 
Ball’s Motives  
Ball imposed sentences that were above the maximum permitted by law 
because British strategic interests depended upon maintaining the Island as 
a stable military base. Popular insurrection could not be countenanced.  The 
severity of the punishments ensured strong general deterrence, denunciation 
and retribution. General deterrence was achieved because Ball wanted to 
signal to Maltese society that all anti-Semites, no matter how young, would 
be severely punished. The infliction of physical punishment by whipping also 
signalled retribution for the assaults and intimidation of individual Jews.  Ball 
must have felt that the crisis was so dangerous that he could not trust the 
Maltese courts to vindicate his ultimate policy goal: the suppression of 
dissent. 
Ensuing events re-inforce this conclusion. The justice system was simply a 
tool by which the Island would be managed in the long term British interest. 
As policy shifted, so the outcomes in individual cases would be altered to 
suit the political needs of the moment.  When the interests of the Maltese 
criminal justice system and British strategic interests collided, Ball would 
prioritise the latter. To borrow from Coleridge, it was to be a triumph of 





Ball’s Volte Face 
As early as June 1805, Bonello‟s mother petitioned the Civil Commissioner 
to have the boy‟s exile rescinded. He had been sent to Gozo where, she 
asserted,  
“(…) he is suffering from hunger and lives in extreme poverty, 
deprived of every human comfort. Wandering around like a 
stranger, he is tormented by other children and (…) he deserves 
compassion” (National Archive of Malta, 92/ 04, box 7, 1805).   
Although the petition was presented barely three weeks into the boy‟s exile, 
Ball granted her request and the boy returned to Malta. Given the serious 
political risks that Ball had run in so publicly breaching the Code de Rohan  
this sudden volte face was surprising. Why had there been such harsh 
repression if he was prepared to relent so soon? 
The favourable outcome in Bonello‟s case naturally triggered another of the 
accused, Andrea Borg, to pursue similar redress, and Ball again relented.  
The successful outcome in Borg‟s case revealed that Ball‟s volte face was not 
linked to troubling second thoughts about juvenile injustice (Registro dei 
Memoriale e Decreti da Sua Excellenza il sig Cavalier Alessandro Ball Regio 
Commissionario Civile di Sua Maestro Britannico,  NAM LIBR 43/11 vol N). 
There had clearly been a general reversal of policy. Criminal justice 
considerations, such as general and individual deterrence were no longer the 
Civil Commissioner‟s guiding principles.  
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Criminal Justice or Political Advantage? 
It is evident that Ball‟s policy had changed. British interests now lay 
elsewhere than in punishing the guilty. Their releases were intended to be 
prominent public relations gesture, which became necessary because it was 
now more important to demonstrate publicly that Ball was a benign, paternal 
governor capable of showing compassion.   A close reading of Coleridge‟s 
other legal and administrative texts reveals how this message had already 
become central to his public relations campaign. Following the damaging 
summary banishment of a Maltese who petitioned the Civil Commissioner for 
political reform, Coleridge had already been forced to present Ball to the 
Maltese public as a paternal figure concerned only for the welfare of the 
Maltese. As the relevant instrument had unconvincingly stated,  
“His Excellency the Royal Commissioner is very much hoping 
to avoid the necessity of punishing anybody, or of making 
anybody suffer even slightly.”  (Avviso March, 22nd 1805, 
LIBR/MS 430 2/2 Bandi 1805 AL 1814  f6). 
Similar statements also appear after the trials of May 1805. 
The reason for Ball‟s sudden reversal of policy can be found in the surviving 
records. At some brief time after Ball‟s anti-Semitic crack-down the Maltese 
nationalists decided to petition the British Crown for political and 
Constitutional reform. They had given up pursuing reform via the Civil 
Commissioner in the Segnatura (the council) because petitioners seeking 
constitutional change were summarily exiled to the Barbary Coast. Once they 
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realised that Ball would brutally suppress any expression of political dissent, 
the Nationalists had to pursue other avenues of redress, which meant 
involving Ball‟s superiors. 
 The petition to the Crown in London was the first of a series of complaints 
complaining of Ball‟s behaviour and incompetence in office that were 
presented to the British Secretary of State during 1805 and 1806. The 
language of the 1805 petition is both revealing and condemnatory. Ball‟s 
„despotic scourge‟ and „thundering vengeance‟  disclosed that the population 
feared his administration. Far from being popular, the British  were perceived 
as omnipotent despots who ruled by arbitrary interventions overruling the 
Maltese judicial process. According to the petitioners, the Civil 
Commissioner showed a ruthlessness that had not even been possible under 
the worst of their former Grandmasters. The petition lists many of the 
perceived policy failures of the British provincial administration. For present 
purposes the most significant requests were that non-one should be 
punished without trial; that cases should be tried by  judges in accordance 
with the law and that the “sentences may be mitigated, but not augmented 
by the Commissioner and that those sentences may be pronounced in open 
court and not first submitted to the Civil Commissioner” (Emphasis supplied). 
The lesson that Ball had learned whilst commanding a ship at sea, namely 
that Rule of Law values contribute to just punishments and a stable  society 
had been forgotten when he ruled the civilians of Malta. It seems that he had 
also overlooked his own injunction that inflicting punishment within the 
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range permitted by the positive law prevented “secret plots and conspiracies” 
and  “took away the very will of resisting”.   
By June 1805 the Maltese were both plotting and resisting.  The petition was 
just the beginning of an organised and sustained attempt to de-stabilise his 
government and have the Civil Commissioner recalled. Soon images and 
graffiti lampooning him and his government were reported to have appeared 
all over Valletta. The agitators wrote to the Secretary of State that there was 
a general loss of faith in Ball.  
  
Coleridge’s Response 
Having reluctantly accepted public office Coleridge was compelled to address 
this imbroglio. The central expectation placed on him in his official role at 
the heart of a government was to maintain stable British rule. His major task, 
which was to Maltese public opinion back in British favour must have been 
formidable.  
Coleridge‟s later opinions on British policy on Malta are elusive and 
contradictory. An early conclusion was that the administration of Malta under 
Ball was a “wicked machinery” (to Daniel Stuart,  August, 22nd, 1806, Letters 
II, 1178). If this truly reflected his position, he may have published the 
posthumous eulogy of his Ball, his former friend and mentor, for reasons of 
loyalty. He might also have felt a sense of collective ministerial responsibility 
which constrained him in public; after all,  Coleridge had been a party to the 
decision-making and could not thereafter publicly dissent from the actions of 
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government. Such a view finds some support in Dorothy Wordsworth‟s letter 
to Catherine Clarkson (to C. Clarkson, November 6
th
 1806). She reported that  
Coleridge only wished to discuss “Malta, Sir Alexander Ball the corruption of 
government”. His explicit reference to corruption reinforce the wickedness to 
which he had already privately referred and sits uneasily with the eulogy of 
Ball.  
 
However, this assessment overlooks the apparently genuine affection for Ball 
that Coleridge exudes in The Friend. One example is typical of Coleridge‟s 
effusive assessment: “(Ball was) a truly great man, (the best and greatest 
public character that I had ever the opportunity of making myself 
acquainted..” (I, 169)  But how did Ball‟s policies align with the principles of 
morally informed government that Coleridge expounded in The Friend? 
 
The Friend 
Coleridge was not troubled by the  Maltese Constitution under which the 
Civil Commissioner ruled on the basis of Royal Instructions from London 
and, emphatically, without a representative assembly. The autocratic 
paternalism and absolute refusal to share power with the Maltese were not, 
characteristics that were necessarily inimical to justice.  The way in which 
governmental power was exercised was more important than the source of 
Constitutional powers.  In other words, Coleridge had decided that who held 
power was unimportant provided that this power was exercised according to 
Reason. Reason, Coleridge explained, is connected to the divine. It is the 
 20 
conscience that informs moral action. It is the distinguishing characteristic of 
humanity. Laws that offended Reason deny the ruled population this 
humanity: 
“Laws obligatory on the conscience, can only (…) proceed from  
that Reason which remains always one and the same, whether 
it speaks through this or that person: like the voice of an 
external Ventriloquist, it is indifferent from whose lips it 
appears to come..” (Friend I, 192). 
Morally informed government was not confined to the realm of Utopian 
politics.Reasoned government, at its most fundamental level, was the most 
effective practical approach to government-the very business of government 
(I,152-3). Coleridge‟s thought that misconceived or inept policy making itself 
derived from unprincipled, “unreasoned” government. Unprincipled, reactive 
politics would become the resort of the unwise governor to side-step 
immediately pressing political difficulties. “State craft”, rather than “state 
wisdom” would be the result. According to Coleridge, reactive policies 
designed to fend off the immediate problems of the moment had the 
appearance rather than the reality of advancing the public interest. 
“Expedient-makers” provided only “fire-engines against fires, Lifeboats 
against inundations; but no houses built fire-proof, no dams that rise above 
the watermark” (I, 152-3). Principled government was the pre-eminent 
characteristic of just and effective government. Policies that were merely 
tailored to seeking short-term political advantage could not truly vindicate 
the public interest. 
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The moral foundations of government were non-derogable. Neither grave  
political crisis nor public emergencies, such as disorder,  justified departure 
from the moral principles underpinning Constitutional principle and civil 
liberty. In this respect Coleridge was certainly consistent: his views were re-
inforced rather than refined by his Malta experiences. He had not altered his 
views since he had condemned Pitt‟s suspension of the writ of habeas corpus 
(EOT 279, 305).  
Coleridge in The Friend identified the rule of law or, as he termed it, the 
„sovereignty of law‟ as the first amongst the hallmarks of a principled 
constitutional order (I 232). He was also clear that the role of government 
was not to pursue the happiness of a people, but to ensure their freedom.   
This was to be achieved by removing restrictive or intrusive laws (however 
defined) leaving only those that prevented one individual from infringing the 
autonomy and freedom of action of another (I, 198). Checks and balances-
correctives such as the free press and public debate of a government‟s 
actions- underpinned civil liberties by constraining the sovereign power (I, 
193). 
Malta under Ball 
A government under the Rule of Law  constrained by a separation of powers 
that would provide minimal checks and balances on the Civil Commissioner 
was, however, entirely absent on Malta. Government was not unaccountable 
because the Maltese lacked the right to dismiss the Ball from office; there 
was no representative assembly, nor public debate on policy questions; 
power was not shared; there was no free press; and the Maltese-speaking 
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population was illiterate. Coleridge‟s complacent account of Malta suggests 
that autocracy was acceptable because it provided strong paternal control of 
a poorly educated people who had shown themselves prone to violent 
insurrection.   
Checks and balances would perhaps be redundant and possibly counter-
productive because Ball, in Coleridge‟s eyes, personified the wise, benign 
governor. In The Friend Coleridge seems to have accepted that even rules of 
Constitutional status could yield where Ball‟s policies required it (I, 544). In 
other words, Coleridge‟s view was that Ball acted wisely in suppressing the 
disturbances, even if this meant departing from the Code de Rohan and the 
principles of a fair trial.  
However, this conclusion means that the morally informed, principled 
government is not founded upon a universal ethical standard. Reason  thus 
offers only a relative or contingent standard. Contrary to Coleridge‟s 
assertion in The Friend that Reason remains “one and the same” regardless 
of the identity of the Sovereign power (I,192) it seems that the circumstances 
of colonial government justified different legal standards from those that 






A  Failure of Policy 
 
Ball‟s political direction of the criminal justice system eventually harvested 
the problems of unprincipled, counter-productive public administration that 
Coleridge later condemned in The Friend.  
 
Eton, the Superintendant of Quarantine who was now resident in England, 
relayed information from informants to the British Secretary of State. He 
complained that Malta was in an “alarming state” (Eton to Windham, October, 
11
th
, 1806, Kew). Ball‟s actions in the disturbances and other events had 
terrified the Maltese. Eton further informed Windham that if Ball discovered 
the identity of his informants their lives would be at risk. He said they “will 
look upon themselves as doomed to perish” (Ibid). Other information 
emanating directly from Malta referred to local “discontent and disharmony” 
(Borg to Eton, May 23
rd
, 1806, Kew).  
 
The undated petition presented directly to the British Crown is the most 
revealing evidence of Maltese anger provoked by Ball‟s criminal justice 
policies. Even the fact that the Maltese could no longer raise their concerns 
directly with Ball is itself suggestive of their deep distrust of him. Besides, all 
avenues for peaceful redress had been exhausted once Ball had summarily 
exiled a petitioner for political reform (Memorial and Petition of the Maltese 
Kew, CO 158/10/151 et seq).   
 
 24 
Coleridge‟s assertion in The Friend that Ball‟s actions during the emergency 
had been „wise‟ (The Friend, I, 544) can be seen as little more than a smoke-
screen. Using the pretext that papers transmitted disease, Ball‟s spies 
opened the mail, and must have gained an inkling of the major allegations 
against him and the demands for reform. Within weeks of the anti-Semitic 
hysteria Ball knew that his policy was unsustainable. This explains why Ball 
suddenly changed his mind and brought the anti-Semites home to Malta. 
Compassion would, he hoped, limit the political embarrassment and calm 
dissent.  The unashamed, public reversal of policy attempted a signal to the 
Maltese that he should not be seen as an inflexible despot. The goal had 
shifted away from interests of criminal justice towards prioritising the 
softening of Ball‟s public reputation. Coleridge was recruited to this 
important task. The Civil Commissioner now wanted to be seen as a 
governor who would even be willing to reverse policy to “avoid the necessity 
of punishing anybody, or of making anybody suffer even slightly”. 
Coleridge was set to work to use government information to counter the 
general suggestions in the petition that Ball was a tyrant. His Bandi and 
Avvisi stress how Ball was a self-sacrificial, benign governor concerned only 
for the welfare of the Maltese.  It was an all-out propaganda offensive: but it 
was now too late to prevent the Secretary of State from demanding that Ball 
give a detailed account of his administration (Windham to Ball,  January, 6
th
, 
1807, Kew, CO 159/3/220). Ball‟s standing and reputation in London had 
been damaged. Moreover, even the loyal Coleridge was later to conclude 
that, “pure lawless despotism grounding itself wholly on terror precludes all 
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consideration of duty”, and further that a patriot has a duty to overthrow 
tyranny (The Friend I, 71). Did his sympathies lie with the Maltese 
Nationalists or did he have other causes in mind in 1818? 
 
The account of the disturbances is one of contradictory and lawless politics 
that Coleridge witnessed at first hand. In The Friend he later concluded that 
Reasoned or principled government was ultimately the only means of 
achieving public interest goals; and he avoided a detailed discussion of Ball‟s 
actions because these so obviously conflicted with his ideal. If the principles 
of The Friend are universal principles,  we might conclude that Coleridge was 
privately critical of Ball‟s methods.  
But there is another possibility. If Coleridge genuinely believed in Ball‟s 
wisdom in office, the conclusion must be that the Maltese entitlements to 
justice were not those Coleridge outlined in The Friend. In other words, 
government according to the rule of law and the principles of fair trial were 
not Maltese entitlements. If this is so, it suggests that his Malta experience 
encouraged Coleridge to move towards a conservative politics that 
accommodated the British goals of Empire.  
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